Man for man, all over the pitch

Every Arsenal player had a responsibility to pick up a Bayern player. Timber on Davies, Rice on Pavlović, Gabriel on Saibari, Calafiori on Gnabry, Ødegaard on Kim, Guimarães on Bischof, Madueke and Eze on the full-backs, Havertz up on Upamecano, and Konsa on Kane.

Bayern did exactly the same when Arsenal had the ball, and it went a lot further than a normal press. When Havertz dropped deep, a Bayern centre-back (typically Upamecano) followed him. When Kane dropped, Konsa went with him. At times you had centre-backs defending on the edge of the other team’s box. That just goes to show how comfortable players need to be these days in all areas of the pitch.

Why? Because a press only works if there’s no free man. In a zonal press you’re covering spaces, and a good team will find the gap between two of your players. Man for man takes away the space where a player can receive the ball. Every short pass is marked, so there’s nobody to build through, and the team on the ball has two choices: go long, or try to play through tight marking and risk a mistake.

And if you win it high, chances are that you’re attacking a team that is out of their regular defensive structure.

So what do you do when every short pass is marked? You go over it. Raya decided to go long instead of building short into Bayern’s press, usually wide towards a winger like Madueke, with bodies getting round the second ball.

Arsenal wanted to avoid the press and the tight marking they would have faced from the Bayern front line. A long ball skips the whole press, because Bayern’s markers have pushed up. Especially when players like Havertz had dropped that bit deeper, towards the ball, to attract defenders away from where the long ball would land.

Then, space has been created so the second ball matters. You don’t need to win the header cleanly, you need players arriving around it, ready to pick it up. Bischof had to step out with Guimarães, and that left space behind him for Ødegaard to run into.

Pulling players out of position and away from where the ball would land was a key strategy for Arsenal to gain territory and avoid building through pressure.

Kane loves dropping into midfield. In this game, when he did, Konsa followed him out of the back line. It was aggressive and brave from Konsa, at times following Kane all the way to the edge of his own penalty area.

Most centre-backs would feel uncomfortable, but these days they’re wired differently. Follow the centre-forward and you leave a hole in the back line. Stay and Kane gets to turn and face the play with time on the ball, and from there he’s one of the best passers in the world.

The rest of the back line has to reorganise around the gap, and that’s the moment to go in behind. On 35 minutes Kane dropped, turned and slid a low ball through midfield and round Timber into the space behind, and Davies ran onto the pass and slotted it into the bottom corner.

That’s why Bayern love Kane dropping. He isn’t just coming short to link play. He’s dragging defenders with him and creating space for others.

I mentioned the risk earlier. Miss a tackle when you’re following someone, or get beaten by one pass, and that’s where the space opens up. In a zonal shape a teammate covers. Here everyone is with their own man, so the player you were marking is suddenly free.

Gabriel had the job of marking Saibari. At one point Saibari dropped deep to combine. He did that successfully with Pavlović, who was released into the space created. One or two touches and the duel has been skipped. This is the risk.

That’s why both teams wanted the ball moving quickly. Take an extra touch and your marker is tight again. Move it first time and you’ve turned a one v one into a two v one in the space of a second. Dragging a defender out creates a gap in the defensive line. Co-ordinated movements with your midfielders mean that vacating the middle of the pitch becomes a possibility to exploit.

Switching off in man to man pressing was shown first hand by Alphonso Davies. Eight minutes from FT, 2-1 Bayern. The move went through Madueke and Gyökeres. Madueke found Rice, Rice played it into Gyökeres with his back to goal, and kept running.

Davies was tracking Rice, but he switched off as Arsenal combined. Rice ran off his blind side, Gyökeres gave it straight back, and Rice cut into the box and finished low from a tight angle into the far corner past Neuer. 2-2.

This is the risk. In man for man, each player has a responsibility for their man. If Davies loses Rice for a second, nobody else can mark him, because everyone else is attached to someone. Stanišić had Madueke and Tah was pinned by Gyökeres. One lapse and a runner is completely free in the most dangerous area on the pitch.

Teams accept that risk because of what it gives them going forward, but switch off and it can hurt.