How Spurs play
out from the back

Against Coventry, De Zerbi went to a back three for the first time at Spurs. In his own words, he set up with “three at the back, one midfielder and three players in the pocket.” Van Hecke, Adarabioyo and Van de Ven across the back, Tonali on his own in front of them, and Maddison, Marmoush and Gray across the inside channels behind Coventry’s midfield.

Why three at the back? It gives the keeper three short options. Coventry’s front two can’t cover all three, and with Tonali and Kinsky added, Spurs have five options building out. At least one of them is always free to receive and carry it.

Tonali is the key to progression. As the single pivot, Coventry had to deal with him. If a presser jumps onto him, the player in the pocket behind is free. If nobody does, Tonali turns and plays out himself. Either way, Spurs are one pass from breaking the first line of the press.

And here’s what people sometimes miss: what it gives you out of possession. De Zerbi said the back three was “the best solution to defend the counter-attack”. The spare centre-back isn’t just there to build. He’s cover when possession switches.

At Stamford Bridge, Chelsea did press Spurs high, with their front three. So where did the press actually start? Rogers and the midfield waited for a pass back to the goalkeeper or across the penalty area, then they jumped. That’s a trigger teams look for.

The key for Spurs was Fernandes. He played behind that first line of pressure as an option to receive, and the full-backs stayed high so Kinsky had someone to play into. That gave Spurs two ways out: through the press via Fernandes, or over it to the full-backs.

That’s why knowing the trigger matters. Once you know it, you know which pass not to play. Spurs have clearly worked on cues and recognising pressing triggers in the new system. Previously, too often players were being caught in midfield as the opponent stepped out. The ball into the middle with the receiver’s back to goal is exactly what Chelsea want. So Spurs circulated it, waited for the Chelsea block to shift across, and either went around them or manipulated the press to find the gaps centrally.

This is where Spurs are beginning to hurt teams. They drew Chelsea towards one side, then switched it. Gray, Kudus and Fernandes pulled the press across on the right, and the next pass was switched out to Robertson.

Why does it work? Because a team that presses together shifts together. Every Chelsea player moves across towards the ball, which is exactly what they’re coached to do. But it means the far side is available.

A lot of Spurs’ best moments at Chelsea came down the left, and that’s where the one v ones came from. Tel, named player of the match, up against Acheampong, Robertson in support. By the time the cover gets across, the winger has already had a go at his man.

Spurs know that they play with risk. Coventry’s equaliser was the latest proof. Early in the second half, a Van Hecke pass went astray, Coventry broke, and Rudoni scored.

That’s the price of playing out short. Lose it this deep and the other team can be one pass from goal, against defenders who are in positions designed for the build-up. But Spurs, and other teams who build this way, know the reward outweighs the risk.

There’s another reason why playing with an extra centre-back matters so much. This is what I call rest attack: the positions players take up, often behind the ball, while their team has possession. The job of rest attack is to be in the right place for when your team loses the ball, so you can stop threats early before they develop.

This will be a key part of Spurs’ development as they nail down their build-up strategy.

How do they cope when the ball is turned over?