Arsenal just know how to lock it down

Liverpool under Iraola want to play out from the back, and Arsenal want to press high. Sixteen minutes in, Alisson takes a goal kick short and tries to find Jacquet. The pass is loose, and Ødegaard is already there.

Arsenal set up in their typical 4-4-2 high press, but there was one key difference this time. Ødegaard was asked to play a different role. He took on a player-marking job on Mac Allister, staying tight to him so he couldn’t receive without pressure. When Mac Allister recognised his cue to drop and support Alisson, that also put Ødegaard in position to jump onto the loose pass. Two roles in one movement. This is what a press is designed to do: maximum pressure to force mistakes, so when the pass is a yard off, he’s close enough to capitalise. You don’t need to win the ball every time, you need to be in the right place for the one time the pass isn’t perfect.

Why does a turnover there hurt so much? Because Liverpool are set up to build, not to defend. The centre-backs are split and the full-backs are already high or wide, getting ready to go. Regain it in these moments and you’re attacking a team that is out of shape.

Pay close attention to Tzolis. This is the technical detail that analysts and coaches drill into their players. His trigger is the pass from Van Dijk, and he arcs his run to force the goalkeeper to play centrally and cut out the clear passing route to Jacquet on the outside. Everyone immediately labels this a goalkeeping error, but it’s the small detail in the attacker’s pressing angle that causes the pass to be played an extra yard too far, allowing Ødegaard to pounce.

After the regain, Arsenal produce the perfect outcome.

It’s an analyst’s dream.

Everything highlighted in the build-up to the game and worked on in training was executed to perfection in the match.

Ødegaard recycles, Guimarães plays it out to Madueke on the right, and Rice runs round the outside of him. Madueke slides it into Rice’s path, Rice drives a low cross across the six-yard box, and Havertz arrives at the back post to tap it in.

Why the overlap from deep?

Because Madueke has the ball and the defender has to deal with him 1v1. When a midfielder sprints past on the outside, someone has to pick that run up, and in a transition it’s incredibly hard to reset in time to track the runner or pass him on to a teammate. Kerkez is isolated and Barcola can’t recover in time to support. Rice senses Kerkez is isolated and recognises the overload in front of him.

And look at the cross. Low, with power and across the six-yard box, not floated. A ball there is almost impossible for a defender to clear without the risk of turning it in, and a keeper can’t come for it. The back post is the blind side for the markers, because everyone is watching the ball.

After the goal, Liverpool laid siege. The momentum completely switched. Iraola’s side built with a back three so Kerkez could push right up on the left. They had 28 touches in Arsenal’s box in the first half, the most by any team against Arsenal in a first half since 2008-09. Wirtz hit the bar with a free kick, and Mac Allister headed over from eight yards.

And still, not one shot on target all game. Raya didn’t have to make a save.

That comes from the middle. Arsenal shut it down. Rice and Guimarães sat in front of the back four and reduced the space for Wirtz and Isak to turn and progress. Liverpool could have the ball, but the priority was to compact the edge of the penalty area and not allow receptions in front of the box. When they did shoot, someone was in the way. Arteta talked about it: “you have to be so good at blocking shots and preventing those spaces for them to get into there.”

This forced Liverpool wide, and they happily obliged by crossing. Despite that appetite to cross, Arsenal showed again why they play as a team. Both wingers are asked to carry just as much defensive responsibility as attacking. Madueke and Tzolis were resolute in their duty to support the full-backs. Reducing the moments when a full-back is isolated buys the team time and forces a delay, allowing the midfielders and centre-backs to regroup and cover the next action, should the attacker win the wide battle.

So Liverpool went round the block instead of through it. Diagonals out to the wings, and more than 30 crosses from Kerkez, Barcola and Araujo, mostly down Liverpool’s left. That moves the whole game into Arsenal’s box, and defending the box against crosses is a skill of its own. Get it wrong once and it’s a goal.

It starts before the ball is even crossed. The moment it goes wide, the back line drops and gets goal-side of its runners, and the centre-backs read the crosser: is his head up, is he opening his body, how much room does he have to whip it in? Recognise the danger before it arrives and you’re already moving when the ball is.

Distances matter. Konsa and Gabriel stay roughly five or six yards apart, close enough to cover each other, but not so close that one ball between them takes both out. The far-side full-back tucks in to protect the back post, and a midfielder drops to the edge of the box for the cut-back. Then it’s body shape and first contact. Side-on, so you can see the ball and your runner at the same time, and attack the ball at its highest point rather than waiting for it to drop. The defender who gets there first wins the header. The one who waits gives the striker a chance.

Timber did his bit on the right too. He handled Barcola well, with help from the midfield doubling up. Then there’s the moment everyone will talk about: Timber holding Isak’s shirt from Barcola’s cross on 21 minutes. No penalty, and VAR didn’t step in. Iraola called it “a clear penalty”. I think Liverpool had a case.

Gary Neville called it “a defensive masterclass”. Konsa and Gabriel were the reason it looked that way.

Last one, and it’s the flip side of the goal. But this isn’t the first time we’ve seen Arsenal use this strategy this season.

Liverpool pressed high and aggressively, and Guimarães was given almost no time on the ball. So Raya went long, bypassing the first line of pressure to Havertz, Tzolis or Madueke. Havertz takes on Van Dijk in the air, and Madueke and Tzolis run off him for the second ball.

Now, it wasn’t the most fruitful strategy, and honestly, they will review it, assess the outcomes and recognise it didn’t bring much success. But it let Arsenal avoid the pressure of an aggressive high press, and took away the chance for Liverpool’s attackers to do to them what Arsenal did to Liverpool.

Why? Because a turnover in your own half at Anfield is how you lose. Arteta said it after the game: Liverpool “can generate vertical attacks almost from a bad clearance or a bad throw”. If you’re going to lose the ball, lose it in their half, not yours.

It wasn’t perfect, and not everything was long. Arsenal had their moments of smart, accurate short passing to beat the press, but a loose Konsa pass kick-started Liverpool’s pressure. Still, it shows a team with a clear plan for this kind of problem. Same idea as the goal, from the other side: don’t give them the chance to win it high.